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APPLICATION NO.	F	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/473,522	12/28/1999		KENNETH A. PARULSKI	78744PRC	1080
1333	7590	10/20/2006		EXAMINER	
PATENT L			GYORFI, THOMAS A		
EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY 343 STATE STREET				ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
ROCHESTER, NY 14650-2201				2135	
•				DATE MAILED: 10/20/2006	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

		Application No.	Applicant(s)				
	Office Action Summan	09/473,522	PARULSKI ET AL.				
	Office Action Summary	Examiner	Art Unit				
		Tom Gyorfi	2135				
Period fo	The MAILING DATE of this communication app or Reply	ears on the cover sheet with th	e correspondence address				
WHIC - Exter after - If NO - Failu Any r	ORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY CHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DANSIONS of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.13 SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication. It is period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period were to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing and patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).	ATE OF THIS COMMUNICAT 6(a). In no event, however, may a reply b ill apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS cause the application to become ABANDO	ION. e timely filed from the mailing date of this communication. DNED (35 U.S.C. § 133).				
Status							
1) 又	Responsive to communication(s) filed on 28 Au	Jaust 2006.					
·	This action is FINAL . 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.						
3)	Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is						
,—	closed in accordance with the practice under <i>Ex parte Quayle</i> , 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.						
Dispositi	on of Claims						
4)⊠	4)⊠ Claim(s) <u>1-25</u> is/are pending in the application.						
-	4a) Of the above claim(s) is/are withdrawn from consideration.						
	Claim(s) is/are allowed.						
	Claim(s) <u>1-25</u> is/are rejected.						
7)	Claim(s) is/are objected to.						
8)	_						
Applicati	on Papers						
9) The specification is objected to by the Examiner.							
10/	10) The drawing(s) filed on is/are: a) accepted or b) objected to by the Examiner. Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).						
	Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.65(a).						
11) The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.							
	ınder 35 U.S.C. § 119		······································				
 12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f). a) All b) Some * c) None of: 1. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received. 2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. 3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)). * See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received. 							
2) Notic 3) Inforr	t(s) e of References Cited (PTO-892) e of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) mation Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08) r No(s)/Mail Date	4) Interview Summ Paper No(s)/Ma 5) Notice of Inform 6) Other:					

DETAILED ACTION

1. Claims 1-25 remain for examination. The correspondence filed 8/28/06 amended claims 6-8 and 10.

Response to Arguments

2. Applicant's arguments filed 8/28/06 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant argues, "Nowhere does Safai disclose that is stored in the camera is generated in the camera itself." Examiner disagrees with this contention, as Safai claims an embodiment of that invention where the digital camera "comput[es] and stor[es] a private key" (Seid, col. 4, lines 9-12; see also Seid's Claim 29, wherein the step of generating and storing the private key is performed in the digital camera as per parent claim 1).

Applicant further argues, "Thus, Silverbrook is looking to random sources that are external to the camera itself". While Examiner admits that the text of the Silverbrook disclosure describes the preferred embodiment of the Noll method – wherein lava lamps are used as the source of randomness – Applicant has conveniently ignored the passages in Noll quoted by the Examiner wherein the Lavarand™ [Noll] invention is not, and has never been, limited to merely taking pictures of lava lamps but can be applied to any chaotic source of randomness (Noll, col. 4, lines 43-45 and col. 6, line 66 – col. 7, line 11; additionally, see Noll's claims 1, 8, and 14 which cover the broad limitation of any chaotic source of randomness, but that the particular embodiment where lava lamps are used – the embodiment that Applicant erroneously believes is the only

embodiment permitted by Noll – are merely claimed in dependent claims 3 and 11). Given that the Noll reference is prior art to Silverbrook as well as the instant application, it is reasonable to assume that Silverbrook would have been aware of this fact, having chosen to use Noll's Lavarand method as an element of Silverbrook's invention. Thus, Silverbrook (and by extension, Safai in view of Silverbrook) disclose a camera that uses its internal image sensor *in some fashion* to generate a random seed which is in turn used to generate keys inside the camera. All that is left to show is that it was known in the art that the noise from the image sensor of a camera, by itself, was known to be a chaotic source of randomness, which is precisely what Eastlake not only discloses but actually encourages in the quoted paragraph(s).

With respect to Applicant's argument against the motivation to combine the references, it is first noted that Applicant only traversed the third point made by the Examiner; even if one were to accept Applicant's traversal arguendo, the argument has no bearing on the validity of the other points noted by the Examiner that would suggest the combination. Additionally, Examiner notes that even Silverbrook was aware that true random generators are superior to pseudo-random generators, particularly as the use of pseudo-random generators permits the possibility that the generator, and by extension the keys derived from it, could be reverse engineered (Silverbrook, col. 180, line 65 – col. 181, line 3). Thus there still remain valid reasons for one of ordinary skill in the art to have made the proposed combination.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103

- 3. The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.
- 4. Claims 1-25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Safai et al (U.S. Patent 6,167,469), Silverbrook et al (U.S. Patent 6,788,336), Noll et al. (U.S. Patent 5,732,138), and Eastlake et al. (RFC1750: "Randomness Recommendations for Security"; hereinafter, "Eastlake").

Referring to Claim 1:

Safai discloses a digital camera of the type employing a private key to encrypt a hash of a digital image captured by the digital camera to produce an image authentication signature, the improvement comprising: (a) a processor located within the digital camera for generating private key and a public key (col. 4, lines 1-15; col. 7, lines 30-40; Claim 29); and (b) means for storing the private key in a memory in the digital camera for subsequent use in encryption of the hash of the digital image to produce the image authentication signature (col. 16, lines 1-10, 20-35).

Safai does not explicitly teach "generating a random seed and for using the random seed to generate a private key and a public key."

Silverbrook discloses a processor located within a digital camera that generates a random seed (col. 189, lines 45-55; col. 173, line 35 – col. 175, line 2) and teaches using a random seed to generate keys (col. 151, lines 12-13; col. 193, line 25 – col. 195, line 25).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to incorporate the teachings of Silverbrook regarding a digital camera generating a random seed and using the random seed to generate keys into the digital camera disclosed by Safai in order to allow it to create the required public and private keys. The motivation for doing so would be to potentially increase the security of the camera by generating keys that cannot be easily compromised by guessing (col. 153, lines 15-20).

Although the preferred embodiment of the Lavarand process as employed by Silverbrook uses an image of lava lamps captured by an image sensor of a digital camera as a chaotic source of randomness, Noll teaches that alternate embodiments are permitted (Noll, col. 4, lines 43-45). A number of alternate sources of chaotic randomness similar to the claimed subject matter are suggested, including both random noise from an electronic component and using an image sensor of a camera to digitize images of various random [natural] phenomena (Ibid, and also col. 1, line 55 - col. 2, line 5). Nevertheless, Eastlake teaches that even prior to the existence of the Noll method, it was well known to digitize the noise from an image sensor of a camera for use as a chaotic source of randomness specifically for the purpose of generating cryptographic keys (Eastlake, Abstract and page 14, section 5.3.1, 1st paragraph). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to use the noise generated entirely by the image sensor of a digital camera such as those of Silverbrook and Safai as the chaotic source of randomness for the camera's Lavarand component. The motivation for doing so is threefold: [1] secure cryptographic keys are more likely to be generated through the use of true randomness rather than pseudo-randomness (Eastlake, Abstract; and page 10, "5. Hardware for Randomness", 1st paragraph); [2] any source of randomness can be improved by the Noll method for the purpose of cryptographic key generation, in the event that the chaotic source does not always return truly random results (Noll, col. 2, lines 20-25 and col. 3, lines 5-25); and [3] it would obviate the need for a user of a camera employing Silverbrook's disclosed technology to carry additional cumbersome hardware to avail oneself of the novel features of that invention, instead relying solely on an internal component already known to be present (Silverbrook, col. 1, lines 49-51).

Referring to Claims 6 and 22:

Safai discloses a method of producing an image authentication signature in a digital camera employing a private key to encrypt a hash of an image captured by the digital camera, the improvement comprising the steps of:

- (a) generating a private key in the digital camera (col. 4, lines 1-15; col. 7, lines 30-40; Claim 29); and
- (b) storing the private key in a memory in the digital camera for subsequent encryption of the hash of the digital image (col. 16, lines 1-10, 20-35).

Safai does not explicitly teach "generating a random seed from a physically random process in the digital camera and using the random seed to generate a private key and a public key."

Silverbrook discloses generating a random seed (col. 189, lines 45-55; col. 173, line 35 – col. 175, line 2) using a physically random process (col. 204, lines 10-20) and using a random seed to generate keys (col. 151, lines 12-13; col. 193, line 25 – col. 195, line 25).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to incorporate the teachings of Silverbrook regarding a digital camera generating a random seed and using the random seed to generate keys into the digital camera disclosed by Safai in order to allow it to create the required private key. The motivation for doing so would be to potentially increase the security of the camera by generating keys that cannot be easily compromised by guessing (col. 153, 15-20).

Although the preferred embodiment of the Lavarand process as employed by Silverbrook uses an image of lava lamps captured by an image sensor of a digital camera as a chaotic source of randomness, Noll teaches that alternate embodiments are permitted (Noll, col. 4, lines 43-45). A number of alternate sources of chaotic randomness similar to the claimed subject matter are suggested, including both random noise from an electronic component and using an image sensor of a camera to digitize images of various random [natural] phenomena (Ibid, and also col. 1, line 55 – col. 2, line 5). Nevertheless, Eastlake teaches that even prior to the existence of the Noll method, it was well known to digitize the noise from an image sensor of a camera for use as a chaotic source of randomness specifically for the purpose of generating cryptographic keys (Eastlake, Abstract and page 14, section 5.3.1, 1st paragraph). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was

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made to use the noise generated entirely by the image sensor of a digital camera such as those of Silverbrook and Safai as the chaotic source of randomness for the camera's Lavarand component. The motivation for doing so is threefold: [1] secure cryptographic keys are more likely to be generated through the use of true randomness rather than pseudo-randomness (Eastlake, Abstract; and page 10, "5. Hardware for Randomness", 1st paragraph); [2] any source of randomness can be improved by the Noll method for the purpose of cryptographic key generation, in the event that the chaotic source does not always return truly random results (Noll, col. 2, lines 20-25 and col. 3, lines 5-25); and [3] it would obviate the need for a user of a camera employing Silverbrook's disclosed technology to carry additional cumbersome hardware to avail oneself of the novel features of that invention, instead relying solely on an internal component already known to be present (Silverbrook, col. 1, lines 49-51).

Referring to Claim 7:

Safai discloses a method of authenticating an image captured by a digital camera, comprising the steps of:

- (a) generating a private key and a public key in the digital camera (col. 4, lines 1-15; col. 7, lines 30-40; Claim 29);
- (b) storing the private key in a memory in the digital camera (col. 16, lines 1-10, 20-35);
 - (c) communicating the public key to a user (col. 4, lines 5-15);
 - (d) capturing a digital image (col. 5, lines 35-45; col. 15, lines 60-65);

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(e) hashing the captured digital image in the digital camera to produce an image hash (col. 16, lines 1-10);

- (f) encrypting the image hash in the digital camera with the private key to produce a digital signature (col. 16, lines 20-35); and
- (g) authenticating the digital image by hashing the image outside of the digital camera, decrypting the digital signature using the public key to produce a decrypted signature, and comparing the decrypted signature with the image hash produced outside of the digital camera (col. 16, lines 10-20).

Safai does not explicitly teach "generating a random seed in the digital camera and using the random seed to generate a private key and a public key."

Silverbrook discloses generating a random seed (col. 189, lines 45-55; col. 173, line 35 – col. 175, line 2) and using a random seed to generate keys (col. 151, lines 12-13, col. 193, line 25 – col. 195, line 25).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to incorporate the teachings of Silverbrook regarding a digital camera generating a random seed and using the random seed to generate keys into the digital camera disclosed by Safai in order to allow it to create the required public key and private key. The motivation for doing so would be to potentially increase the security of the camera by generating keys that cannot be easily compromised by guessing (col. 153, lines 15-20).

Although the preferred embodiment of the Lavarand process as employed by Silverbrook uses an image of lava lamps captured by an image sensor of a digital

camera as a chaotic source of randomness, Noll teaches that alternate embodiments are permitted (Noll, col. 4, lines 43-45). A number of alternate sources of chaotic randomness similar to the claimed subject matter are suggested, including both random noise from an electronic component and using an image sensor of a camera to digitize images of various random [natural] phenomena (Ibid, and also col. 1, line 55 – col. 2, line 5). Nevertheless, Eastlake teaches that even prior to the existence of the Noll method, it was well known to digitize the noise from an image sensor of a camera for use as a chaotic source of randomness specifically for the purpose of generating cryptographic keys (Eastlake, Abstract and page 14, section 5.3.1, 1st paragraph). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to use the noise generated entirely by the image sensor of a digital camera such as those of Silverbrook and Safai as the chaotic source of randomness for the camera's Lavarand component. The motivation for doing so is threefold: [1] secure cryptographic keys are more likely to be generated through the use of true randomness rather than pseudo-randomness (Eastlake, Abstract; and page 10, "5. Hardware for Randomness", 1st paragraph); [2] any source of randomness can be improved by the Noll method for the purpose of cryptographic key generation, in the event that the chaotic source does not always return truly random results (Noll, col. 2, lines 20-25 and col. 3, lines 5-25); and [3] it would obviate the need for a user of a camera employing Silverbrook's disclosed technology to carry additional cumbersome hardware to avail oneself of the novel features of that invention, instead relying solely on an internal component already known to be present (Silverbrook, col. 1, lines 49-51).

Referring to Claim 8:

Safai discloses a method of manufacturing a digital camera capable of producing a digital signature useful for image authentication, comprising the steps of:

- (a) manufacturing a digital camera with an internal processor for generating a public key and private key, storing the private key in a memory in the digital camera and communicating the public key to a camera operator (col. 16, lines 20-40);
 - (b) sending the digital camera to an authentication service (col. 15, lines 15-25);
- (c) activating the digital camera at the authentication service to produce the public key and private key, and registering the public key at the authentication service (col. 15, lines 15-25; col. 16, lines 20-40); and
 - (d) sending the digital camera to a user (e.g. col. 1, lines 37-47).

Safai does not explicitly teach "generating a random seed in the digital camera and using the random seed to generate a private key and a public key."

Silverbrook discloses generating a random seed (col. 189, lines 45-55; col. 173, line 35 – col. 175, line 2) and using a random seed to generate keys (col. 151, lines 12-13; col. 193, line 25 – col. 195, line 25).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to incorporate the teachings of Silverbrook regarding a digital camera generating a random seed and using the random seed to generate keys into the digital camera disclosed by Safai in order to allow it to create the required private key. The motivation for doing so would be to potentially increase the security of the camera by generating keys that cannot be easily compromised by guessing (col. 153, 15-20).

Although the preferred embodiment of the Lavarand process as employed by Silverbrook uses an image of lava lamps captured by an image sensor of a digital camera as a chaotic source of randomness, Noll teaches that alternate embodiments are permitted (Noll, col. 4, lines 43-45). A number of alternate sources of chaotic randomness similar to the claimed subject matter are suggested, including both random noise from an electronic component and using an image sensor of a camera to digitize images of various random [natural] phenomena (Ibid, and also col. 1, line 55 - col. 2, line 5). Nevertheless, Eastlake teaches that even prior to the existence of the Noll method, it was well known to digitize the noise from an image sensor of a camera for use as a chaotic source of randomness specifically for the purpose of generating cryptographic keys (Eastlake, Abstract and page 14, section 5.3.1, 1st paragraph). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to use the noise generated entirely by the image sensor of a digital camera such as those of Silverbrook and Safai as the chaotic source of randomness for the camera's Lavarand component. The motivation for doing so is threefold: [1] secure cryptographic keys are more likely to be generated through the use of true randomness rather than pseudo-randomness (Eastlake, Abstract; and page 10, "5. Hardware for Randomness", 1st paragraph); [2] any source of randomness can be improved by the Noll method for the purpose of cryptographic key generation, in the event that the chaotic source does not always return truly random results (Noll, col. 2, lines 20-25 and col. 3, lines 5-25); and [3] it would obviate the need for a user of a camera employing Silverbrook's disclosed technology to carry additional cumbersome hardware to avail oneself of the

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novel features of that invention, instead relying solely on an internal component already known to be present (Silverbrook, col. 1, lines 49-51).

Referring to Claim 9:

Safai discloses a digital camera of the type employing a private key to encrypt a hash of a digital image captured by the digital camera to produce an image authentication signature and a metadata signature corresponding to one or more metadata values, the improvement comprising:

- (a) a processor located within the digital camera for generating a public key and a private key (col. 4, lines 1-15; col. 7, lines 30-40; Claim 29); and
- (b) means for storing the private key in a memory in the digital camera for subsequent use in encryption of the hash of the digital image to produce the image authentication signature and the metadata signature (col. 16, lines 1-10, 20-35).

Safai does not explicitly teach "generating a random seed in the digital camera and using the random seed to generate a private key and a public key."

Silverbrook discloses generating a random seed (col. 189, lines 45-55; col. 173, line 35 – col. 175, line 2) and using a random seed to generate keys (col. 151, lines 12-13; col. 193, line 25 – col. 195, line 25).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to incorporate the teachings of Silverbrook regarding a digital camera generating a random seed and using the random seed to generate keys into the digital camera disclosed by Safai in order to allow it to create the required private key.

The motivation for doing so would be to potentially increase the security of the camera by generating keys that cannot be easily compromised by guessing (col. 153, 15-20).

Although the preferred embodiment of the Lavarand process as employed by Silverbrook uses an image of lava lamps captured by an image sensor of a digital camera as a chaotic source of randomness, Noll teaches that alternate embodiments are permitted (Noll, col. 4, lines 43-45). A number of alternate sources of chaotic randomness similar to the claimed subject matter are suggested, including both random noise from an electronic component and using an image sensor of a camera to digitize images of various random [natural] phenomena (Ibid, and also col. 1, line 55 – col. 2, line 5). Nevertheless, Eastlake teaches that even prior to the existence of the Noll method, it was well known to digitize the noise from an image sensor of a camera for use as a chaotic source of randomness specifically for the purpose of generating cryptographic keys (Eastlake, Abstract and page 14, section 5.3.1, 1st paragraph). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to use the noise generated entirely by the image sensor of a digital camera such as those of Silverbrook and Safai as the chaotic source of randomness for the camera's Lavarand component. The motivation for doing so is threefold: [1] secure cryptographic keys are more likely to be generated through the use of true randomness rather than pseudo-randomness (Eastlake, Abstract; and page 10, "5. Hardware for Randomness", 1st paragraph); [2] any source of randomness can be improved by the Noll method for the purpose of cryptographic key generation, in the event that the chaotic source does not always return truly random results (Noll, col. 2, lines 20-25 and col. 3, lines 5-25);

and [3] it would obviate the need for a user of a camera employing Silverbrook's disclosed technology to carry additional cumbersome hardware to avail oneself of the novel features of that invention, instead relying solely on an internal component already known to be present (Silverbrook, col. 1, lines 49-51).

Referring to Claim 10:

Safai discloses a method of producing an image authentication signature in a digital camera, comprising the steps of:

- (a) capturing a digital image (col. 15, lines 60-65);
- (b) compressing the captured digital image (col. 14, lines 15-25);
- (c) generating, a public key and private key in the digital camera (col. 4, lines 1-15; col. 7, lines 30-40; Claim 29);
- (d) storing the private key in a memory in the digital camera (col. 16, lines 1-10, 20-35);
 - (e) providing one or more metadata values (col. 16, lines 1-15);
- (f) hashing the compressed captured digital image and at least one of the metadata values to produce an image hash (col. 16, lines 1-10); and
- (g) encrypting the image hash to produce the image authentication signature (col.16, lines 20-30).

Safai does not explicitly teach "generating a random seed in the digital camera and using the random seed to generate a private key and a public key."

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Silverbrook discloses generating a random seed (col. 189, lines 45-55; col. 173, line 35 – col. 175, line 2) and using a random seed to generate keys (col. 151, lines 12-13; col. 193, line 25 – col. 195, line 25).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to incorporate the teachings of Silverbrook regarding a digital camera generating a random seed and using the random seed to generate keys into the digital camera disclosed by Safai in order to allow it to create the required private key. The motivation for doing so would be to increase the security of the camera by generating keys that cannot be easily compromised by guessing (col. 153, lines 15-20).

Although the preferred embodiment of the Lavarand process as employed by Silverbrook uses an image of lava lamps captured by an image sensor of a digital camera as a chaotic source of randomness, Noll teaches that alternate embodiments are permitted (Noll, col. 4, lines 43-45). A number of alternate sources of chaotic randomness similar to the claimed subject matter are suggested, including both random noise from an electronic component and using an image sensor of a camera to digitize images of various random [natural] phenomena (Ibid, and also col. 1, line 55 – col. 2, line 5). Nevertheless, Eastlake teaches that even prior to the existence of the Noll method, it was well known to digitize the noise from an image sensor of a camera for use as a chaotic source of randomness specifically for the purpose of generating cryptographic keys (Eastlake, Abstract and page 14, section 5.3.1, 1st paragraph). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to use the noise generated entirely by the image sensor of a digital camera such

as those of Silverbrook and Safai as the chaotic source of randomness for the camera's Lavarand component. The motivation for doing so is threefold: [1] secure cryptographic keys are more likely to be generated through the use of true randomness rather than pseudo-randomness (Eastlake, Abstract; and page 10, "5. Hardware for Randomness", 1st paragraph); [2] any source of randomness can be improved by the Noll method for the purpose of cryptographic key generation, in the event that the chaotic source does not always return truly random results (Noll, col. 2, lines 20-25 and col. 3, lines 5-25); and [3] it would obviate the need for a user of a camera employing Silverbrook's disclosed technology to carry additional cumbersome hardware to avail oneself of the novel features of that invention, instead relying solely on an internal component already known to be present (Silverbrook, col. 1, lines 49-51).

Referring to Claim 2:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose all the limitations of claim 1 above. Silverbrook further discloses an image sensor for capturing images (element 2 of Figure 2) and wherein the processor includes means for producing a random seed for the private key by processing an image captured from the image sensor so that the random noise level in the captured image is used in producing the random seed (col. 173, line 35 - col. 175, line 2; col. 193, line 25 - col. 195, line 25; col. 204, lines 10-20).

Referring to Claims 3 and 25:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose the limitations of claims 2 and 22 above. Safai further discloses

- (i) a variable gain amplifier coupled to the image sensor (col. 5, lines 45-60);
- (ii) an analog-to-digital converter coupled to the variable gain amplifier and the processor for producing digital signals corresponding to the captured images (col. 5, lines 50-60); and
- (iii) the processor causing the variable gain amplifier to be in a high gain condition when the initial test image is captured (col. 5, lines 55-60).

Referring to Claim 4:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose the limitations of claim 1 above. Silverbrook further discloses wherein the processor includes one or more algorithms for producing a random seed, wherein the random seed is used to produce a random number k, and for using the random number k to create the image authentication signature by hashing the raw image data prior to image processing (col. 173, line 35 – col. 175, line 2; col. 193, line 25 – col. 195, line 25; col. 204, lines 10-20).

Referring to Claim 5:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose the limitations of claim 4 above. Safai further discloses the processor includes an image processing algorithm which uses JPEG compression (col. 14, lines 15-25).

Referring to Claim 11:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose the limitations of Claim 10 above. Safai further discloses storing in an image file in the digital camera, the image authentication signature, the compressed digital image data, and the one or more metadata values (col. 12, lines 1-15; col. 14, lines 10-25; col. 16, lines 1-10).

Referring to Claim 12:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose the limitations of Claim 10 above. Safai further discloses the encrypting step includes encrypting the image hash with a private key produced in the digital camera to produce the image authentication signature (col. 16, lines 1-40).

Referring to Claim 13:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose the limitations of Claim 10 above. Safai further discloses wherein the encrypting step includes encrypting the image hash with the private key to produce the image authentication signature (col. 16, lines 25-40); and further including the step of authenticating the captured digital image by hashing the compressed digital image outside of the digital camera, decrypting the image authentication signature using the public key to produce a decrypted signature, and comparing the decrypted signature with the image hash produced outside of the digital camera (col. 16, lines 10-25).

Referring to Claim 14:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose the limitations of Claim 1 above. Safai further hashing the uncompressed captured digital image to produce a random number k (col. 16, lines 1-10); and wherein the encrypting step includes using the random number k to produce the image authentication signature (col. 16, lines 20-35).

Referring to Claim 15:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose the limitations of Claim 1 above.

Safai further discloses the encrypting step further produces a metadata signature corresponding to one or more metadata values (col. 16, lines 1-10; col. 12, lines 50-60).

Regarding claims 16-21:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose the limitations of Claims 1 and 6-10 above. Safai also discloses firmware memory, wherein the private key is produced using an algorithm stored in the firmware memory (col. 7, lines 50-55).

Neither Safai nor Silverbrook explicitly disclose "wherein the algorithm is deleted from the firmware memory after the private key is generated." However, Silverbrook teaches that an attacker could gain control of the program [algorithm] used to generate a random seed and use it to reverse engineer a private key, while not being authorized to do so (col. 155, line 55-60). This suggests that it would be desirable to delete the algorithm used to generate a private key after the unique private key for a digital camera has been generated. Furthermore, Silverbrook also teaches that another method of

defeating the protection afforded by the authentication chip is to reverse engineer the chip so as to determine the inner workings of the algorithms contained therein (col. 156, lines 55-60). In addition, as noted previously by Applicant, Silverbrook discloses that the keys should only be produced at the place of manufacture, implying that the consumers/end-users has no valid reason to possess any means to create or alter keys themselves (e.g. col. 200, lines 30-45). All of these facts suggest that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the combination of Safai and Silverbrook [and Noll and Eastlake] to delete the algorithm from the firmware memory after the private key is generated, in order to prevent it from falling into the wrong hands.

Regarding claim 23:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose all the limitations of claim 22 above. Silverbrook further discloses including an image sensor for capturing images, and wherein the physically random process is dependent upon a random seed produced from a random noise level in a captured image (col. 204, lines 10-20).

Regarding claim 24:

Safai, Silverbrook, Noll, and Eastlake disclose all the limitations of claim 23 above. It is now taken as Applicant admitted prior art that the random images taken by the image sensor in the Silverbrook disclosure would necessarily contain random dark fields [relative to other portions of the image that are lighter in color], and that this data

would necessarily be incorporated into the random number generated by the disclosed process (see the Office action of 7/12/05, page 5). Alternatively, Eastlake discloses this limitation (page 14, section 5.3.1, 1st paragraph).

Conclusion

5. **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Tom Gyorfi whose telephone number is (571) 272-3849. The examiner can normally be reached on 8:30am - 5:00pm Monday - Friday.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Kim Vu can be reached on (571) 272-3859. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

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